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Abstract 
Grid computing, emerging as a new paradigm for next-generation 
computing,  enables  the  sharing,  selection,  and  aggregation  of 
geographically  distributed  heterogeneous  resources  for  solving 
large-scale problems in science, engineering, and commerce. The 
resources  in  the  Grid  are  heterogeneous  and  geographically 
distributed. The paper demonstrates the capability of economic-
based systems for wide-area parallel and distributed computing 
by using auction-oriented approach. In this paper implementation 
of the various auction models-English Auction, Dutch Auction, 
First-Price Sealed Auction, Continuous Double Auction is done.  
Also these models are compared. 
Keywords: Grid computing, Resource management, Economic 
models, Auction Models 
I.  Introduction 
The  auction  model  supports  one-to-many  negotiation, 
between a service provider (seller) and many consumers 
(buyers), and reduces negotiation to a single value (i.e., 
price). The auctioneer sets the rules of auction, acceptable 
for  the  consumers  and  the  providers.  Auctions  basically 
use  market  forces  to  negotiate  a  clearing  price  for  the 
service. In the real world, auctions are used extensively, 
particularly for selling goods/items within a set duration. 
The three key players involved in auctions are: resource 
owners,  auctioneers  (mediators)  and  buyers.  Many  e-
commerce portals such as Amazon.com and eBay.com are 
serving as mediators (auctioneers). The steps involved in 
the auction process are [9]: 
a)  GSPs announce their services and invite bids. 
b)  Brokers offer their bids (and they can see what other 
consumers  offer  if  they  like  -  depending  on 
open/closed). 
c)  Step (b) goes on until no one is willing to bid higher 
price or auctioneer stops if the minimum price line is 
not met. 
d)  GSP offers service to the one who wins. 
e)  Consumer uses the resource. 
Depending  on  various  parameters,  auctions  can  be 
classified into four types: 
1.  English Auction (first-price open cry) 
2.  First-price sealed-bid auction 
3.  Dutch Auction 
4.  Continuous Double Auction  
Most of the related work in Grid computing dedicated to 
resource  management  and  scheduling  problems  adopt  a 
conventional style where a scheduling component decides 
which  jobs  are  to  be  executed  at  which  site  based  on 
certain  cost  functions  (Legion  [3],  Condor  [7],  AppLeS 
[1], Netsolve [2], Punch [6]). 
II.  Auction Protocols 
This  section  presents  a  brief  overview  of  the  auction 
protocols  examined  in  this  work.  FIPA  standards  were 
followed  for  the  implementation  of  English  and  Dutch 
auctions policies [4] [5]. 
 
English  Auction  (EA):  The  English  auction  [8]  is  an 
ascending auction in which the auctioneer tries to find the 
price of a good by proposing a price below the supposed 
market  value  and  slowly  raising  the  price.  Initially,  the 
auctioneer  issues  a  call  for  proposals,  then  waits  to  see 
whether a bidder is interested in taking the good for that 
price. As soon as a bidder makes a proposal, the auctioneer 
will issue a new call for proposals with an increase in the 
price. The auction stops when no bidder is interested in 
paying the current price for the good. Thus, the auctioneer 
allocates the good to the bidder who has made the past 
highest bid. In English Auction (first-price open cry), all 
bidders  are  free  to  increase  their  bids  exceeding  other 
offers. When none of the bidders are willing to raise the 
price anymore, the auction ends, and the highest bidder 
wins the item at the price of his bid.  
 
Dutch  auction  (DA):  The  Dutch  auction  [8]  is  a 
descending auction and differs from the English auction in 
the sense that the auctioneer starts by issuing a call for 
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market value. The auctioneer then gradually decreases the 
price until some bidder shows interest in taking the good 
for the price announced. The auctioneer starts with a high 
bid/price and continuously lowers the price until one of the 
bidders takes the item at the current price. It is similar to 
first-price sealed-bid auction because in both cases the bid 
matters only if it is the highest and no relevant information 
is revealed during the auction process.  
The interaction protocols for Dutch auction are as follows: 
the  auction  attempts  to  find  market  price  for  a 
good/service by starting at a price much higher than the 
expected  market  value,  then  progressively  reducing  the 
price until one of the buyers accepts the price. The rate of 
reduction in price is up to the auctioneer and they have a 
reserve price below which not to go. If the auction reduces 
the  price  to  reserve  price  with  no  buyers,  the  auction 
terminates. In terms of real time, Dutch auction is much 
more efficient as the auctioneer can decrease the price at a 
strategic rate and first higher bidder wins.  
 
First-Price  Sealed  Auction  (FPSA):  In  our 
implementation of the First-Price sealed auction, bidders 
are not aware of each other's offers. In addition, it is a 
single round auction, which makes it very similar to an e-
procurement.  In  our  policy,  the  minimum  price  is  the 
reserve price of the good. When bidders receive a call for 
proposals, they can verify the minimum price and either 
decide to bid or not to bid for the good. The auctioneer 
waits a given time for the bids and then allocates the good 
to  the  bidder  who  has  valued  the  good  the  most.  The 
auctioneer  then  informs  bidders  about  the  final  price  a 
price and is the winner when it clears the auction. In this 
case a broker bid strategy is a function of the private value 
and the prior beliefs of other bidders’ valuations. The best 
strategy is bid less than its true valuation and it might still 
win the bid, but it all depends on what the others bid. 
 
Continuous  Double  Auction  (CDA):  The  Continuous 
double auction [8] works with a system of bids and asks. 
The price is found by matching asks and bids. After the 
auction is started, the auctioneer accepts asks and bids and 
tries to match asks and bids. The auctioneer informs the 
bidder and the seller about the price  when it  matches a 
match  is  done.  It  is  the  primary  economic  model  for 
trading of equities, commodities, and derivatives in stock 
markets (e.g. NASDAQ). In the double auction model, buy 
orders (bids) and sell orders (asks) may be submitted at 
anytime during the trading period. If at any time there are 
open bids and asks that match or are compatible in terms 
of  price  and  requirements  (e.g.,  quantity  of  goods  or 
shares),  a  trade  is  executed  immediately.  The  double 
auction model has high potential for Grid computing. The 
brokers can easily be enabled to issue bids depending on 
budget, deadline, job complexity, scheduling strategy, and 
resource characteristics requirements and GSPs can issue 
asks depending on current load and perceived demand, and 
price constraints. Both orders can be submitted to GMD 
agents  that  provide  continuous  clearance  or  matching 
services. Since bids are cleared continuously, both GRBs 
and  GSPs  can  make  instant  decisions  with  less 
computational overhead and complexity. 
III.  Experimental Setup and  
Implementation Details 
In order to evaluate the suitability of the auction protocols 
for  resource  allocation  in  Grids,  we  performed  several 
experiments.  We  have  implemented  policies  for  English, 
Dutch, First-Price sealed and Continuous auctions. We used 
three resources. The first experiment considers an English 
model. In this there are three different selling prices-100, 
200 and 300. The three buyers are buyer 1, buyer 2 and 
buyer 3. 
Implementation of English Auction 
Algorithm used: 
￿  All bidders are initially active. 
￿  Start price and increment are fixed. 
￿  At each stage of the bidding: 
1.  Auctioneer calls out last price + increment 
2.  Zero or more bidders may become inactive 
3.  If  at  least  2  bidders  are  still  active,  auction 
proceeds to the next stage. 
4.  If only one auctioneer is active, then he wins at the 
current price. 
 
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
100  110  130  120 
200  210  230  240 
300  310  320  330 
Table 1: Table for English Auction 
Implementation of Dutch auction 
Algorithm used: 
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￿  Start price and decrement are fixed. 
1.  At each stage of the bidding: 
2.  Auctioneer calls out last price – decrement 
3.  If  at  least  one  bidder  says  yes,  then  the  first 
bidder to respond wins at the current price. 
4.  Else auctioneer proceeds to the next round. 
Table: Decremented Level-20 
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
100  90  Buyer 2=80  _ 
200  Buyer 
1=200 
_  _ 
300  260  270  Buyer 
3=260 
Table 2: Table for Dutch auction 
 
Implementation of FPS Auction 
Algorithm used: 
￿  The price inserted into the bid is the price initially 
estimated by the bidder announced. 
￿  Steps followed in First-Price sealed are: 
1. Ask bids. 
2. Display the winner having the highest bid. 
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
X  100  300  200 
Y  100  200  300 
Z  300  100  200 
Table 3: Table for FPS Auction 
Implementation of Continuous Double Auction 
Algorithm used: 
￿  The  price  inserted  into  the  bid  is  the  price  initially 
estimated by the bidder announced. 
￿  In  Continuous  double  auctions,  the  auctioneers 
match asks and bids. The auctioneer maintains a list of 
asks ordered in a decreasing order and a list of bids 
ordered in an increasing order. When the auctioneer 
receives and ask she proceeds as follows: 
1.  She compares it with the first bid of the list. If the 
price  in  the  ask  is  greater  than  or  equal  to  the 
bid’s value, it informs that seller and bidder can 
trade at the price (price ask + price bid) / 2) 
2.  Otherwise, the auctioneer adds the asks in the list. 
If the auctioneer receives a bid, she does the following: 
1.  She compares it with the first asks of the list. If 
the price in the ask is greater than or equal to the 
bid’s    value, it informs that seller and bidder can 
trade at   the price (price ask + price bid) / 2). 
2.  Otherwise, the auctioneer adds the bid in the list.  
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
300  40  50  60 
200  70  80  90 
100  100  _  _ 
Table 4: Continuous double auction in which buyer 1 is 
winner 
 
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
300  110  120  130 
200  150  200  _ 
100  _  _  _ 
Table 5: Continuous double auction in which buyer 2 is 
winner 
 
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
300  260  270  300 
200  _  _  _ 
100  _  _  _ 
Table 6: Continuous double auction in which buyer 3 is 
winner 
 
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
300  _  _  300 
200  _  200  _ 
100  100  _  _ 
Table 7: Winner’s table in CDA 
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IV.   Experimental Results and Analysis 
Evaluations Results of English Model 
The first experiment considers an English model. In this 
there are three different selling prices-100, 200 and 300. 
The three buyers are buyer 1, buyer 2 and buyer 3. All 
bidders  are  initially  active.  Starting  price  is  100  and  is 
incremented  in  each  level.  At  first  stage  of  the  bidding 
auctioneer calls out last price and increment 100. In round 
1
st buyer 2 is winner. In round second and third buyer 3 is 
winner. 
English Auction: According to the various prices, graph 
has  been  plotted  for  buyer  1,  buyer  2  and  buyer  3  and 
winner’s graph has been plotted for only winners of each 
selling price. 
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
100  110  130  120 
200  210  230  240 
300  310  320  330 
Table 8: Table for English Auction 
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Figure 1: Price interactions of different buyers in 
English Auction 
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  Figure 2: Winner’s Graph for English Auction 
Evaluations Results of Dutch Model 
The second experiment considers a Dutch model. In this 
there  are  three  different  selling  prices  -  100,  200  and 
300.The three buyers are buyer 1, buyer 2 and buyer 3. All 
bidders are initially inactive. Starting price is 100 and is 
decremented in each level.  At  first stage of  the bidding 
auctioneer  calls  out  last  price  and  decrement  it. 
Decremented level is set 20.In round 1
st buyer 2 is winner, 
in round second buyer 1 is winner and in third buyer 3 is 
winner. 
Table: Decremental Level-20 
Selling Price  Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
100  90  Buyer 2=80  _ 
200  Buyer 
1=200 
_  _ 
300  260  270  Buyer 
3=260 
Table 9: Table for Dutch Auction 
According to the various prices, graph has been plotted for 
buyer 1, buyer 2and buyer 3 and winner’s graph has been 
plotted for only winners of each selling price. IJCSMS International Journal of Computer Science and Management Studies, Special Issue of Vol. 12, June 2012 
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 Figure 3: Price interactions of different buyers in Dutch 
Auction 
Winner’s graph: 
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Figure 4: Winner’s graph for Dutch Auction 
Evaluations Results of First Price Sealed Model 
The third experiment considers a First Price Sealed. The 
three buyers are buyer 1, buyer 2 and buyer 3.It simply asks 
the bids and display the winner having the highest bid. In 
round  1
st  buyer  2  is  winner,  in  round  second  buyer  3  is 
winner and in third buyer 1 is winner. 
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
X  100  300  200 
Y  100  200  300 
Z  300  100  200 
Table 10: Table for First Price Sealed Auction 
According to the various prices, graph has been plotted for 
buyer 1, buyer 2and buyer 3 and winner’s graph  
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Figure 5: Price interactions of different buyers in First-
Price Sealed Auction 
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Auction 
Evaluations Results of Continuous Double Auction 
The  4th  experiment  considers  a  Continuous  Double 
Auction. The three buyers are buyer 1, buyer 2 and buyer 
3.It simply asks the bids and display the winner having the 
highest  bid.  ,  the  auctioneers  match  asks  and  bids.  The 
auctioneer maintains a list of asks ordered in a decreasing 
order and a list of bids ordered in an increasing order. In 
table 1 asks and bids are matched at 100. In table 1
st buyer 
1 is winner; in round second buyer 2 is winner and in third 
buyer 3 is winner. 
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
300  40  50  60 
200  70  80  90 
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Table 11: Continuous double auction in which buyer 1 
is winner 
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
300  110  120  130 
200  150  200  _ 
100  _  _  _ 
Table 12: Continuous double auction in which buyer 2 
is winner 
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
300  260  270  300 
200  _  _  _ 
100  _  _  _ 
Table 13: Continuous double auction in which buyer 3 
is winner 
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
300  _  _  300 
200  _  200  _ 
100  100  _  _ 
Table 14: Winner’s table in CDA 
According to the various prices winner’s graph has been 
plotted  for  only  winners  of  each  selling  price  on 
Algorithms 4 / 15. 
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 V.  COMPARISION  OF  VARIOUS  MODELS  AND 
EVALUATION OF RESULTS 
In  fifth  experiment  four  auction  models  i.e.  English 
Auction,  Dutch  auction,  First  Price  sealed  auction  are 
compared and graph has been plotted. 
 
English Auction: 
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
100  100  80  300 
200  200  250  300 
300  350  300  260 
Dutch Auction-Decremental level=20 
Table  15:  Table  for  English  Auction  having  buying 
value same to other models 
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
100  100  80  300 
200  200  250  300 
300  350  300  260 
Table 16: Table for Dutch Auction having buying value 
same to other models 
First Price Sealed Auction: 
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
  100  80  300 
  200  250  300 
  350  300  260 
Table 17: Table for First Price Sealed Auction having 
buying value same to other models 
Continuous Double Auction: 
Selling 
Price 
Buyer 1  Buyer 2  Buyer 3 
300  100  80  300 
200  200  250  300 
100  350  300  260 
Table 18: Table for Continuous Double Auction having 
buying value same to other models 
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VI.   Conclusion and Future Work 
We performed several experiments in order to evaluate the 
suitability of the auction protocols for resource allocation 
in  Grids.  We  have  implemented  policies  for  English, 
Dutch,  First-Price  sealed  and  Continuous  auctions.  We 
used  three  resources.  The  first  experiment  considers  an 
English  model.  In  this  there  are  three  different  selling 
prices-  100, 200  and  300.The  three  buyers  are  buyer  1, 
buyer 2 and buyer 3. 
We  have  carried  out  experiments  that  demonstrate  that 
English  auctions  present  higher  price  demand  while 
Continuous double auctions presents least. In addition, we 
demonstrated that English and Dutch auctions lead to the 
same final prices, It can also been noted from the graph 
that  English  and  first  price  sealed  lines  coincides  and 
hence  winners  are  same  in  these  two  models.  The 
experiment also shows buyer 1 is winner in case of Dutch 
auction and continuous Double Auction. 
It provides good bases for further work on auction oriented 
approach.Efforts are underway to propose a model which 
allows  bidders  to  bid  on  various  attributes  beyond  the 
price. 
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